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Abstract  
 Banks are exposed to several forms of risks that affect their performance. The main objective of banking 
management is to maximize wealth. In efforts to realize this goal managers and shareholders should evaluate the 
cash flows and risks to direct its financial resources in different areas of use. This paper aims to investigate the 
effect of credit risk management (CRM) on financial performance (FP) of banks in Ghana. The indicators used in 
the study are CRM, bank credit (BC), liquidity risk (LR) and capital risk (CR) are regressed on FP. The CADF and 
CIPS panel unit root tests report that, the variables are non-stationary at their levels but become stationary at their 
first difference. The Westerlund-Edgerton panel bootstrap cointegration test show that, the variables are 
cointegrated and hence possess a structural long-run relationship. Also the Granger causality through the ARDL 
model show; (1) A two-way causality between bank credit and FP in the long-period and short-period; (2) A 
positive and significant one-way cause running from liquidity to FP, a one-way causality between capital risk and 
FP, lastly one-way causality in the long-period for LR and bank credit are evidenced; (3) The ARDL framework 
is evidenced to be very significantly effective to the application of Granger causativeness test.  
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1.INTRODUCTION 
Banks are exposed to various types of risks, that affect their performance and activity in their efforts to attain 
profitability. Credit risk is one of the most challenging risks that banks manage on daily basis. The management 
of credit risk affect a bank’s profitability (Li and Zou, 2014). Musyoki and Kadubo (2012) suggest that the global 
banking industry has made improvement in credit risk management. Until the early 1990s, credit risk assessment 
was generally limited to individual loan reviews, as banks maintained most of the loan proceedings in their books 
until maturity. Today, credit risk management incorporates both loan reviews and portfolio analysis. Furthermore, 
the growth of new technologies for risk analysis has allowed many banks to move away from the traditional 
bookkeeping and maintain credit practice in favor of a more innovative approach. Much more than in the past, 
today's banks can manage and control concentrations of debtors and portfolios, maturities and loans, and even 
eliminate problematic assets before they generate losses. According to Cuthbertson et al. (2007), risk management 
technology has been very popular in recent years. Through the adoption of technology banks are able to banks to 
classify, evaluate, resolve and reduce risk in a way that was not possible ten years ago.  
Hakim and Neaime (2001) examined the effect of liquidity, credit, and capital on bank performance in banks 
in Egypt and Lebanon. Their finding is positive concerning the risk manage practices by banks in both countries. 
Gakure et al. (2012) examine the effect of credit risk management analysis on banking performance. They conclude 
that financial risks in banking organizations can result in the imposition of constraints on the ability of banks to 
meet their business goals. Also, private banks are more likely to apply credit risk management policies than state-
owned banks. Musyoki and Kadubo (2012) assess various parameters pertinent to credit risk management as it is 
crucial to the financial performance of banks. They conclude that their parameters used in the study had a negative 
impact on a banks’ financial performance; Nawaz et al. (2012) reveal that credit risk management had a strong 
influence on profitability. They recommend that management should be cautious in setting up a credit policy that 
might not negatively affect profitability.  
Many studies have also been conducted on the importance of credit risk management on financial profitability. 
According to Makkar and Singh (2013), financial profitability is measured by correctly establishing the association 
between balance sheet items and the income statement. The process of establishing a relevant association is called 
financial analysis, which consists of calculating financial ratios. Ongore and Kusa (2013) postulate that Return on 
Assets (ROA) is one of the key ratios that indicate the profitability of a bank. It measures the ability of the bank's 
management to generate income using the assets of the company at its disposal (Booyens et al., 2018). Another 
related ratio is the return on equity (ROE), which measures the amount of earnings a company earns relative to the 
total equity invested or recorded in the balance sheet. This is the rate of return for shareholders or the percentage 
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return on each unit of capital invested in the bank (Booyens et al., 2018). A company with a high return on equity 
is more likely to generate cash internally (Ongore and Kusa, 2013). 
Kalluci (2011) study the ROA and the ROE and reveal that while they differ from each other and express 
different things, they remain the two main indicators of management effectiveness to generate revenue from the 
funds invested by the shareholders and the total investments made. One of the reasons given is that the ROE gives 
no indication of the financing of the debt bank, unlike the ROA (Kalluci, 2011). The ROE therefore gives a limited 
insight into the profitability and performance of the bank (Hanweck and Kilcollin, 1984). 
Naceur and Goaied (2001) identify profitability performance as an important indicator of a bank’s future 
profitability. High earnings performance indicates that the market assumes lower earnings growth in the future and 
low earnings performance indicates that the market is expecting strong earnings growth over the long time. 
Murerwa (2015) identify two levels of financial profitability; (1) Endogenous refers to the profitability factors that 
can be influenced by the bank's management decisions. (2) Exogenous factors represent profitability independent 
of the influence of the bank. 
The studies discussed above mostly investigated the impact of credit risk management on the FP of banks 
using different measurement variables. ROA is used as a proxy for financial profitability among 15 commercial 
banks in Ghana from 2007-2017 in this study. Also, there exist a number of studies that examine the effect of 
credit risk on financial profitability. These studies often use econometric methods that assume cross-sectional 
independence and heterogeneity. Unlike other studies, we employ second generation econometric tools to achieve 
the aforesaid objectives as contrasting to the mainstream of the state-of-the-art which use first generation tests that 
fail to consider both issues that may exist in the panel data. 
 
2.The model  
2.1 Households 
The model outlined in this paper represents a small open economy. The employed framework is a variant of 
Brzoza-Brzezina and Makarski (2011) with the banking sector of Gambacorta and Signoretti (2014). The model 
operates with two types of financial frictions, a collateral constraint imposed on entrepreneurs introduced in line 
with Iacoviello (2005) and a constraint on the amount of bank leverage as in Gerali et al. (2010). It also includes 
two sources of inefficiencies nominal rigidities in the form of a Calvo (1983) pricing scheme with inflation 
indexation and the quadratic adjustment costs à la Rotemberg (1982). 
The model functions with two types of mediators: households and entrepreneurs. Households consume, 
supply labour and make deposits in commercial banks. Entrepreneurs consume, borrow funds from commercial 
banks and use them in a production process where labour supply and physical capital are combined to produce the 
wholesale goods. Entrepreneurs also face capital utilization. Domestic and exporting retailers buy the wholesale 
goods, differentiate them at no cost and resell them in domestic and foreign goods markets. Importing retailers 
import goods produced in the foreign economy. Since retailers possess some degree of power in a price-setting 
scheme, the law of one price does not hold necessarily. Commercial banks collect deposits from households and 
provide loans to entrepreneurs at given interest rates. The central bank sets its main policy interest rate to influence 
conditions in the financial as well as the real side of the economy. The foreign sector is represented by three 
variables (inflation, interest rate and output) and it is modelled as simple independent AR processes. 
Each household chooses consumption   , labour supply  , deposits and foreign bonds ∗ in order to 
maximize the expected utility (1) with respect to the budget constraint (2) 
	 
  log −  − ∅1 + ∅ 

	
 
 +  + ∗ ≤ ! + "#$%&#$%'() + "#$%*#$%+#,
∗#$%() -                                                                            
where  is the discount factor of households,  is the external habit stock with i being a parameter 
characterizing the degree of habit persistence and / is the inverse of the Frisch wage elasticity of labour supply. 
Preferences are subject to a disturbance affecting consumption  · π2 = 4)4)$%  is the nominal exchange rate, !  is 
the real wage earned by households, rt is the net nominal interest rate on deposit,  1 + 5∗1 + 6 is a risk 
adjusted net nominal return paid on foreign bonds denominated in foreign currency, and -  represents a lump-sum 
transfer that includes profits from the ownership of domestic retailers, importing retailers and capital goods 
producers. 
Following Adolfson et al. (2008), the debt-elastic risk premium is defined as: 
1 + 6 = 78 9−:∗  
∗
;<=;> = 78 ?−:∗ @
A∗
<=;BC 
With A∗ = +#,#D#  being the real outstanding net foreign assets position of the domestic economy, GDPt 
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referring to gross domestic product, and :∗ being the parameter characterizing the elasticity of the risk premium. 
The first-order conditions for households are the labour supply equation, the Euler equation and the standard UIP 
condition 
∅ = !E −  
1 + 5 = 1
  −  − 
   π2 
 1 + 51 + 5 ∗ =
Fπ2Fπ∗2 1 + 6 
Where F =  D#∗D#  is the real exchange rate with tp   being the foreign price level.  
 
2.2 Banking Sector  
The banking sector is showed conferring to Gambacorta and Signoretti (2014), who present a basic form of the 
banking sector resultant by Gerali et al. (2010). Commercial banks possess certain market power in intermediation 
which enables them to change interest rates in response to various shocks. Banks must obey a balance-sheet 
condition stating that loans=deposit bank capital. Banks also face an “optimal” exogenous target for the capital-
to-asset ratio (i.e. the inverse of leverage). The banking sector is composed of a continuum of commercial banks 
indexed by G∈ (0, 1). Each commercial bank consists of two units wholesale and retail. The role of the wholesale 
unit is to collect deposits from households and to issue wholesale loans. The retail unit purchases wholesale loans, 
differentiates them and resells them to entrepreneurs 
 
2.3 Wholesale Unit 
The wholesale unit of each bank operates under perfect competition. The wholesale unit obtains deposits H from 
households at the interest rate set by the central bank 5H and issues loans H at the net wholesale rate 5twb. The 
balance sheet of the wholesale branch consists of bank capital ItB and deposits H on the liability side, while on 
the asset side can be found loans H. Commercial banks face an optimal value of the capital-to-asset ratio JA with 
the quadratic adjustment costs parameterized by KA. Bank capital evolves according to  
π2K2M = 1 − δM K2Ma2M + J2M 
                                                                                                 
where δM is the depreciation rate representing the cost for managing the commercial banks capital position J2M 
represents overall profits as outlined by equation (7) and Q is a disturbance term.  
The wholesale unit chooses the optimal level of deposit dt and loans bt in order to maximize profits 
5R,G − 5G − SQ2 
IQGG − UQ
V IQG 
                                                          (8) 
With respect to the balance-sheet constraint bt+ktB. The first order condition defines the wholesale interest rate on 
loans 
5 R, = 5 − SQ IQ − UQ 
IQ 
V
 
                                                                                              (9)                                       
2.4 Retail unit                                                                                          
The retail units operate in a monopolistically competitive market. Each retail unit purchases wholesale loans from 
the wholesale unit, differentiates them at no cost and resells them to entrepreneurs. It is assumed that the retail unit 
applies constant 5,", = 5 − SQ 
IQ − UQ 
IQ  + WQ 
                                                                                          (10)                                        
where 
"#XYZX# is the disturbance on the interest rate on loans. Banks profits combine all partial net earnings. 
Aggregate bank profits are given by  
GQ = 5, − 5 − SQ2 
IQ − UQ I, 
                                                                                           (11)               
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2.5 Central Bank 
In the baseline scenario, monetary policy of the central bank is characterized by the strict inflation targeting regime 
in which the central bank adjusts the policy rate, 5H, in response to deviations of inflation [H from its steady-state 
value. The monetary policy rule takes the form. 
1 + 5 = 1 + 5'+"1 + 5+" \π2π ]
+(^_ " 
                                          (12) 
where "  depicts monetary policy inertia, e[ is a weight assigned to inflation and art is the disturbance to the 
policy interest rate. 
 
3.Data and Econometric methods  
The studies by(Kaaya and Pastory, 2013; Makkar and Singh, 2013; Nawaz et al., 2012) have investigated the 
impact of credit risk management on the PF in the banking regulatory framework in which CRM indicators are 
regressed on the financial performance of banks. First, the direction of the fixed factors was confirmed. A 
cointegration test by Pedroni and Kao was used to determine if there exists an association between the investigated 
factors, where in FP endogenous and CRM remained exogenous. In addition, a Granger causality test decides to 
expand the panel if there is an association between the factors. This document uses a quantifiable system and uses 
a secondary data source from bank of Ghana. This examination utilizes a panel time series information to research 
on the impact of CRM on FP for 15 banks in Ghana covering the period 2007 to 2017 for the factors which 
incorporate C, LR, and CR. The information with detail to the aforesaid factors were accomplished from the 
surveyed reports of the 15 banks in Ghana. The bank of Ghana requires all banks to distribute their evaluated report 
freely on a yearly premise. The information per every factor was converted into common logarithm in order to 
derive the parameter estimations with regards to the definitiveness of the reliant variable (CRM). The banks for 
this investigation includes Ecobank Ghana Limited, Access Bank Ghana Limited, Agricultural Development Bank 
(ADB), Ghana Commercial Bank (GCB), Barclays Bank Ghana Limited, Fidelity Bank Ghana Limited, UT Bank 
Limited, Sahel Sahara Bank Limited, Guarantee Trust Bank Limited, Universal Merchant Bank Limited, HFC 
Bank Ghana Limited, First Atlantic Bank Ghana Limited, National Investment Bank Ghana Limited, First National 
Bank Limited, and Cal Bank Limited. These are the biggest banks and added to over partial of the financial 
framework resource and have been appraised by the degree. Results from the information were brought forth 
utilizing EVIEWS 9.0 and STATA 13.0 together with SPSS 20.0. Table 1 shows the outline of the informational 
index while the engaging measurements (mean, standard deviation, skewness, and kurtosis) of the different factors 
incorporated into the panel time’s series information are delineated in Table 2. Table 1 delineates the profile of the 
aforementioned factors (all in common logarithm from 2007-2017). 
Table 1: Data set 
Variable Definition Source 
FP Financial performance of Banks Bank of Ghana 
BC Bank Credit Bank of Ghana 
LR Liquidity risk Bank of Ghana 
CR Capital risk Bank of Ghana 
 
1.1 Descriptive statistics 
Summary of Table 2 demonstrates the graphic indicators for the factors Financial Performance, bank credit, 
Liquidity risk and capital risk separately. Every one of the factors from Table 2, as expressed as of now are changed 
over into a characteristic logarithm. Engagingly, Table 2 uncovers that, for the sample of banks utilized in the 
investigation, FP, C, and CR on the normal are 14.361%, 10.007 and 10.751 with a standard deviation of 0.414, 
1.374 and 1.395 individually, which are genuinely enormous contrasted with the mean and standard deviation of 
LR ( M=9.580 SD=1.395). LR with the most elevated standard deviation estimation of 1.395, implying that LR 
influence FP of banks in Ghana. With respect to the skewness, every one of the factors is adversely skewed, 
complimenting to one side when contrasted with the ordinary estimation. With respect to the kurtosis, FP and LR 
are over the ordinary esteem demonstrating the sharp to be leptokurtic whiles the sharp of bank Credit and Capital 
risk are mesokurtic since they have their individual kurtosis to be roughly 3. For an arrangement to be distributed 
the skewness and kurtosis should around be 0 and 3 individually. In this manner, the primary end from the shape 
statistics is that every one of these indicators financial performance, credit, liquidity risk and capital risk cannot 
be affirmed to be ordinarily distributed. This is in agreement with the JB-TEST which delineate that, there is an 
adequate affirmation to reject the typicality null theory for all the indicators.  
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Table 2: Descriptive statistics. 
Statistic FP C LR CR 
Mean  14.361 10.077 9.580 10.751 
Median  14.420 10.218 9.755 10.920 
Std. Dev. 0.414  1.374 1.395  0.973 
Skewness -0.370 -0.668 -0.625 -0.602 
Kurtosis  3.553 2.735 3.106 2.878 
Jarque-Bera (JB) test 
value  
5.862*  12.771*** 10853***  10.093*** 
Probability of JB 0.053 0.001 0.004 0.006 
Observation  165 165 165 165 
Note: *, **, ***indicates the rejection of the Jarque-Bera (JB) null hypothesis of normality at 
1%, 5%, and 10% percent significance level. 
 
3.2 Correlation analysis and multicollinearity test 
The results from Table 3 indicate that the arrangement of the factors (bank credit, Liquidity risk and capital risk) 
have a factual momentous positive connection with FP, the VIF and pairwise connection among the arrangement 
of indicators gives an assorted variety of measures for surveying the problem of multicollinearity in a numerous 
relapse diagnostic. Multicollinearity is contamination of one of the desires for relapse investigation. (Dormann et 
al., 2013) proposed a strategy for diagnosing and identifying multicollinearity. Table 3 gives the indication that, 
there is no existence of multicolinearity among the explanatory variables since the Tolerance values are not less 
than 0.2 and VIF values are far less than 5. This therefore implies that; the aforementioned variables are actually 
independent of each other and hence can be considered as independent variables and assumed to have effect on 
financial profitability. The results determine that credit has a moderate positive association with FP (r=0.582, 
P<0.000). This infers a rate increment in bank credit compares to an ascent increase in FP considered for the 
examination. Essentially, LR (r=0.552, P<0.000) and CR(r=0.689, P<0.000) have a measurably moderate 
association on FP. The outcomes likewise infer that LR has a moderate positive association with credit (r=0.904, 
P<0.000) and CR has a moderate association with credit (r=0.644, P<0.000). Additionally, credit risk from the 
outcomes likewise demonstrates a moderate positive association with LR (r=0.567, P<0.01). 
Table 3: Results of correlation test and multicollinearity test. 
Variables   FP BC LR CR Tolerance VIF 
FP Pearson correlation  1      
 Sig (2-tailed)       
BC Pearson correlation  0.582*** 1   0.200 0.011 
 Sig (2-tailed) 0.000      
LR Pearson correlation  0.552*** 0.904*** 1  0.200 0.028 
 Sig (2-tailed) 0.000 0.000     
CR Pearson correlation  0.689*** 0.644*** 0.567***  0.553 0.009 
 Sig (2-tailed) 0.000 0.000 0.000 1   
Note: ***indicates the significance at 1%. The statistical significance or insignificance at 1% level refers to sample 
evidence which allows the researcher to reject or not to reject the null hypothesis with a probability of type 1 error 
of 1%.  
 
3.3 Empirical results and Discussions 
3.3.1 Cross-sectional independence test 
Both CDP-test and the CDLMadj test are utilized to research variable in other to investigate whether panel time series 
data has cross-sectional conditions. The results from the previously mentioned cross-sectional reliance tests are 
classified in Table 4. Signifying to the related likelihood values, the invalid assumption of cross-sectional 
independence for credit, liquidity risk and capital risk is rejected. This, consequently, gives the suggestion that the 
panel time's series data which incorporates the factors has cross-sectional independence. Moreover, in 
advancement to the homogeneity test utilizing by (Dogan & Seker, 2016a), the findings uncover that the null 
theory of homogeneity is rejected at 1% level showing that, the slope coefficients are heterogeneous over every 
cross-area. The paper agrees that the measurement in the panel time's series data including the factors under 
discussion show cross-sectional conditions and heterogeneity. Henceforth this paper in the accompanying stage 
utilizes the CIPS and CADF panel unit root test in the resulting segment to research the incorporation properties 
of the factors. 
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Table 4: Cross-sectional dependence test. 
Variable Cross-sectional dependence test    
CDP-test p-value  CDLMadj test p-value  
FP 30.906*** 0.000 57.079*** 0.000  
BC 32.440*** 0.000 63.643*** 0.000  
LR 30.954*** 0.000 57.709*** 0.000  
CR 32.465*** 0.000 63.781*** 0.000  
Note: *** represents the rejection of the null hypothesis at a 1% level of significance. The CDP-test of (Pesaran, 
2004) and CDLMadj test of (Pesaran & Yamagata, 2008) tests the null hypothesis cross-sectional independence. 
3.3.2 Panel unit root test 
As indicated in the methodology of this examination, CIPS and CADF panel unit root tests are utilized as an option 
of ordinary unit root test, for example, Breitung, IPS, and LLC panel unit root tests (Gengenbach, Palm, & Urbain, 
2009). This is because of the reality the ordinary panel unit root test makes them inadequacy regarding the 
existences of cross-sectional independence. Most fundamentally, the CADF and CIPS unit root test produce 
reliable outcomes in the event of cross-sectional independence as kept up by the consequences of (Dogan, Seker, 
& Bulbul, 2017). Results of the CIPS and CADF test are then expressed in Table 6. The two tests illuminate that 
the factors under investigation are not stationary at their first difference. Therefore, this gives the sign that the 
factors bank credit, liquidity risk and capital risk are altogether coordinated at the same lag (I(1)). 
Table 5: CIPS and CADF panel unit root tests 
Variabl
es 
CADF CIPS Decisio
n  Levels First difference Levels First 
difference 
Consta
nt  
Consta
nt and 
trend 
Constant Constant 
and trend 
Consta
nt 
Constan
t and 
trend 
Consta
nt 
Constan
t and 
trend 
FP -3.190 -3.617 -
3.325*** 
-
3.911**
* 
-1.721 -1.890 -2.251 -1.972 I(1) 
CR  -1.730  -1.693  -1.726 -1.578 -1.727 -2.294 -2.657 -2.621 I(1) 
LR -1.795  -1.868 -1.745 -1.988 -1.987 -2.348 -3.020 -3.166 I(1) 
CRM -1.813 -1.680 -1.658 -2.296 -2.475 -2.379 -3.081 -2.527 I(1) 
Note *** and **, and * represents the rejection of the null hypothesis at 1% and 5% and 10% level of significance 
respectively.  
3.3.3 Panel cointegration test  
Table 6 introduces the findings in advancement to the (Pedroni, 2004) Panel Cointegration test. Among the seven 
measurements from the Pedroni panel cointegration test, five proposed to the rejection of no cointegration null 
hypothesis. Inside this arrangement of five statistics, we discovered Panel PP and Group PP-measurement just as 
Panel ADF and Group ADF-statistics as progressively noteworthy and solid. Per the outcome from the Table 6, 
the null hypothesis of no cointegration is rejected at 5% by the Panel V-statistics while the PP-statistics for both 
Panel and Group alongside the ADF-statistics additionally for both Panel and Group rejects the null theory at a 
significant of 1%. We can, therefore, conclude that there exists a long-run connection in the midst of Financial 
Performance, bank credit, liquidity risk and capital risk   in our sample of 15 banks. 
Table 6: Results from (Pedroni, 2004) cointegration test. 
Common AR coefficients (within-dimension) 
 Statistic P-value 
Panel v-statistic 1.369* 0.085 
Panel rho-statistic 3.312 0.999 
Panel PP-statistic -3.674*** 0.000 
Panel ADF-statistic -2.835***  0.002 
Individual AR coefficient (between-dimension) 
Group rho-statistic 4.616                                         1.00 
Group PP-statistic -7.785***   0.000 
Group ADF-statistic -2.452***   0.007 
Note: *** denotes the homogeneous coefficients at the crucial stage regressors over the cross-section using the 
equivalent approaches as the Pedroni cointegration test. 
With respect to the results of the Kao panel cointegration test showed in Table 7, it is recognized that the 
investigated factors are cointegrated and consequently have Cointegration associations. This is on the realities that 
there is sufficient proof to reject the null theory of no cointegration for the elective hypothesis of cointegration at 
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1% significant level. On the other hand, the consequences of both the Pedroni and Kao panel cointegration tests, 
we reach on the nearness of cointegration between the investigated factors utilized in the examination. 
Table 7: Kao cointegration test. 
                                          t-statistic Probability value 
                ADF                 -1.890 0.029 
***represents the rejection of the null hypothesis at the 1% significance level. The Kao 
panel cointegration test is based on the null hypothesis of no cointegration 
Moreover, the Pedroni and Kao Cointegration tests are effective and widely utilized in writing they have their 
own curbs with regards to the existences of cross-sectional connections and heterogeneity. As per (Dogan & Seker, 
2016b), the disappointment for a strategy for cointegration to have the option to address the issues of cross-
sectional reliance and heterogeneity prompts loss of proficiency in uncovering the nearness of a long-run 
relationship among factors. In this way in checking for the robustness of the previous outcomes from the Pedroni 
and Kao Panel Cointegration test separately. The examination further utilized the Westerlund-Edgerton Panel 
bootstrap cointegration test. This panel cointegration test is viewed as a second era cointegration test and considers 
the issues of cross-sectional conditions and heterogeneity. This test also considers various measurements 
dependent on gathering and panel individually. Outline of findings from the Westerlund-Edgerton board bootstrap 
cointegration test is accounted for in Table 8.  
From the outcomes in Table 8, Gt, Ga, Pt, and Pa recorded the null assumption of cointegration considering 
the P-values. Considering the P-value which was attained from bootstrapped p-values (where the p-values are 
bootstrapped) the unacceptable assumption of no cointegration is not terminated by all cases demonstrating more 
grounded proof of auxiliary long-run relationship in the midst of Financial Performance, bank credit, liquidity risk 
and capital risk among banks in Ghana. In order to utilize (Pedroni, 1999), (Kao, 1999), (Westerlund, 2005) Panel 
cointegration tests, there should not be a cross-sectional reliance in a model. In spite of the fact that there is no 
cross-sectional reliance, following panel cointegration tests planned by (Westerlund & Edgerton, 2007b) panel 
cointegration test structured by (Westerlund & Edgerton, 2007b) was utilized in our examination. The test can be 
utilized together in instances of cross-sectional reliance and freedom. Moreover, the test permits heterogeneity 
among the units framing the panel. Along these lines, they are more finished than (Pedroni, 1999), (Kao, 1999), 
(Westerlund, 2005) tests. 
Table 8: Results from (Westerlund and Edgerton, 2007a) bootstrap cointegration experiment. 
Statistic Value Robust p-value  
Gt -2.627 0.039 
Ga -17.120 0.000 
Pt -14.062 00.000 
Pa -8.202 0.848 
Note: The Westerlund-Edgerton bootstrap panel cointegration test considers the null hypothesis of no cointegration.  
As determined in the previous sections, the bootstrap strategy can be utilized when there happens cross-
sectional reliance in a model. In the nonexistence, the asymptotic standard conveyance is dominant. Giving to the 
bootstrap strategy, both the gatherings and the panel are factually unimportant. As per the asymptotic standard 
dissemination, both the gatherings and the panel measurements are factually significant. Hence, the unacceptable 
theory of no cointegration is dismissed in asymptotic conveyance despite the fact that it is not dismissed in the 
bootstrap technique. In our model, the consequence of the asymptotic standard conveyance is thought about since 
there is no cross-sectional reliance on the model. In this unique circumstance, we can make a conclusion that there 
is a cointegration in our model and BC, LR, and CR, are connected over the long run. 
3.3.4 Granger causality test 
Table 9 present outcomes from the Granger causality test performed in the investigation to characterize the basic 
long-run connection between the factors: Financial Performance (FP), bank credit, liquidity risk and capital risk. 
The outcomes show bi-directional causation among credit and financial performance at 1% level significant 
correspondingly. There is Uni-directional causation which keeps running from LR to FP measurably noteworthy 
at 1% level, a Uni-directional relationship in the midst of CR and FP at 1% significant dimension. On the other 
hand, the outcomes additionally demonstrate that LR ganger causes BC at 5% factual noteworthy and show a uni-
directional association. At long last, there is no-causality running from CR to BC and CR to LR. The Granger 
causality test result demonstrates proof of causal relations in the midst of the indicators credit risk management 
and financial performance estimated with ROA affirming the theory of causal relations of Banks in Ghana. 
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Table 9: Granger causality test results. 
hypothesis Obs F-statistics P-value Decision Type of causality 
 
BC-FP                         
FP-BC 
LR-FP 
FP-LR 
CR-FP 
FP-CR 
LR-BC 
BC-LR 
CR-BC 
BC-CR 
CR-LR 
LR-CR 
 
150
 
150 
 
150 
 
150 
 
150 
 
150 
 
5.463** 
 5.903** 
4.285** 
 0.548 
 8.990*** 
 0.883 
0.611 
7.436*** 
0.790 
0.240 
0.033 
0.593 
 
0.020 
0.016 
0.040 
0.599 
0.003 
0.348 
0.435 
0.007 
0.375 
0.624 
0.855 
0.442 
 
Reject 
Reject 
Reject  
Fail to reject 
Reject  
Fail to reject 
Fail to Reject  
Reject 
Fail to Reject  
Fail to reject 
Fail to reject 
Fail to reject 
 
Bi-directional 
 
Uni-directional 
 
Uni-directional 
 
Uni-directional 
 
No-directional  
 
No-causality 
 
4.Discussion 
With the aim of investigating the impact of credit risk management on financial profitability of banks in Ghana, a 
presentation of Pesaran-Yamagata homogeneity test and Pesaran CD test disclosed the existence of heterogeneity 
and cross-sectional dependence among the analyzed variables. The presence of cross-sectional dependence and 
heterogeneity implies that changes with respect to the variable of concern in one bank is likely to affect a similar 
variable in other banks. Our findings per the existence of slope heterogeneity and cross-sectional dependence are 
generally in line with that of (Dogan & Aslan, 2017). The application of CADF and CIPS panel unit root test 
further showed that the analyzed variables in all panels are integrated of the same order (I(1)) in other words 
stationary. As it is important to work with stationary variables in time series regression models, this study ensured 
stationary variables are used in the estimation. Econometrically, working with stationary variables avoids 
producing spurious results. This is in agreement with findings of (Dogan & Aslan, 2017), a study in EU countries, 
(Dogan & Seker, 2016a) in OECD countries who employed the CADF and CIPS as well as (Asafu-Adjaye, Byrne, 
& Alvarez, 2016) and (Eggoh, Bangaké, & Rault, 2011) who only applied CIPS unit root test in the context of 
global and African countries respectively. 
 
4.1 Conclusions and policy recommendations. 
This study considered the effect of credit risk management on financial performance and examine the causal link 
amid the measurement variables (bank credit, liquidity risk and capital risk) for 15 banks in Ghana covering the 
period 2007 to 2017. First, considering the results from homogeneity assessment and Pesaran CD's checks, we 
detect the presence of heterogeneity and cross-sectional correlations for the explored data. Second, the CADF and 
CIPS panel unit root tests report that, the variables are non-stationary at their stages but become stationary at their 
first transformations. Third, the Westerlund-Edgerton panel bootstrap cointegration test show that, the variables 
are cointegrated and hence possess a structural long-run relationship. Forth, results from the PMG estimator 
through the panel ARDL model show that; (1) A two-way connectedness is verge by bank BC and FP in the long-
period and  short-period; (2) A positive and significant one-way cause running from liquidity to FP, a one-way 
cause amid capital risk and FP lastly one-way causality only in the long-period for LR and BC are evidenced; (3) 
The PMG estimator through the panel ARDL framework is evidenced to be very significantly effective to the 
application of Granger causativeness test. Though difference parameter estimates are evidenced, the results is 
generally consistent with that of the PMG in terms of connections. 
Empirical findings of this study provide more facts to understand the connection among the variables 
examined and also help policymakers to design policies based on the indicators understudied. These empirical 
results deliberate policy recommendations in a step by step method as follows; 
1. First, short-term and long-term causalities through the ARDL model discovered a two-way connectedness 
is verge by bank credit and FP in the long-period short-period. This depicts that, bank credit and FP are 
connected, an increase in BC leads to rise in FP, and whiles the increase in FP indicates positive increase 
in BC. Thus, as profitability increases, policymakers in Africa should develop measure to make BC 
policies very actual and precise.  
2. A positive and significant one-way cause running from LR to FP, a one-way cause amid capital risk and 
FP and lastly one-way causality only in the long period for LR and credit are evidenced. 
The research also revealed that credit risk management indicators included in this paper are important 
variables to explain financial performance of banks in Ghana. The results of the empirical analysis in this study 
offers the following recommendations, through which they can work to improve credit risk management and to 
have an effective role in the implementation of performance. 
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Ghanaian banks should consider, bank credit, liquidity risk and capital as important in the determination of 
credit risk management. For banks to design an effective system of credit risk management should establish an 
appropriate credit risk environment; operating under a sound credit granting process, maintaining an appropriate 
credit administration, involving monitoring, treatment and adequate controls over credit risk. Banks must set and 
develop strategies that will limit not only the credit risk exposure but to develop the performance and 
competitiveness of banks, and banks should develop appropriate strategies for credit risk management by 
conducting an assessment before granting loans to customers. 
Finally, banks should consider the tender of best policy ethics, which have been the focus of collective 
consideration in the field of distribution of interest rates in recent years, principally owing to political insufficient 
rules which remain an essential source in the banking sector. The central objective of real interest rate policy is to 
reach the adjusted ratio of risk for banks, interest rate spread within acceptable limits. In addition, banks must 
manage the rules of the entire interest rate. 
 
Reference  
Asafu-Adjaye, J., Byrne, D., & Alvarez, M. (2016). Economic growth, fossil fuel and non-fossil consumption: A 
Pooled Mean Group analysis using proxies for capital. Energy economics, 60, 345-356.  
Booyens, M., Nayagar, K., & Le Roux, C. L. (2018). An empirical analysis of South African bank profitability. 
Paper presented at the 4th 2018 Academy of Business and Emerging Markets (ABEM) Conference. 
Brzoza-Brzezina M, Makarski K (2011): Credit Crunch in a Small Open Economy. Journal of International Money 
and Finance, 30(7):1406-1428. 
Cuthbertson, K., Nitzsche, D., & Hyde, S. (2007). Monetary policy and behavioural finance. Journal of Economic 
Surveys, 21(5), 935-969.  
Dogan, E., & Aslan, A. (2017). Exploring the relationship among CO2 emissions, real GDP, energy consumption 
and tourism in the EU and candidate countries: Evidence from panel models robust to heterogeneity and 
cross-sectional dependence. Renewable and Sustainable Energy Reviews, 77, 239-245.  
Dogan, E., & Seker, F. (2016a). The influence of real output, renewable and non-renewable energy, trade and 
financial development on carbon emissions in the top renewable energy countries. Renewable and Sustainable 
Energy Reviews, 60, 1074-1085.  
Dogan, E., & Seker, F. (2016b). An investigation on the determinants of carbon emissions for OECD countries: 
empirical evidence from panel models robust to heterogeneity and cross-sectional dependence. 
Environmental Science and Pollution Research, 23(14), 14646-14655.  
Dogan, E., Seker, F., & Bulbul, S. (2017). Investigating the impacts of energy consumption, real GDP, tourism 
and trade on CO2 emissions by accounting for cross-sectional dependence: A panel study of OECD countries. 
Current Issues in Tourism, 20(16), 1701-1719.  
Dormann, C. F., Elith, J., Bacher, S., Buchmann, C., Carl, G., Carré, G., . . . Leitão, P. J. (2013). Collinearity: a 
review of methods to deal with it and a simulation study evaluating their performance. Ecography, 36(1), 27-
46.  
Eggoh, J. C., Bangaké, C., & Rault, C. (2011). Energy consumption and economic growth revisited in African 
countries. Energy Policy, 39(11), 7408-7421.  
Gakure, R., Ngugi, J. K., Ndwiga, P. M., & Waithaka, S. M. (2012). Effect 0f Credit Risk Management Techniques 
0n The Performance 0f Unsecured Bank Loans Employed Commercial Banks In Kenya. International journal 
of business and social research, 2(4), 221-236.  
Gambacorta L, Signoretti F (2014): Should Monetary Policy Lean Against the Wind? An Analysis Based on A 
DSGE Model Wwth Banking. Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control, 43:146-174. 
Gengenbach, C., Palm, F. C., & Urbain, J.-P. (2009). Panel unit root tests in the presence of cross-sectional 
dependencies: Comparison and implications for modelling. Econometric Reviews, 29(2), 111-145. 
Gerali A, Neri S, Sessa L, Signoretti F (2010): Credit and Banking in a DSGE Model of the Euro Area. Journal of 
Money, Credit and Banking, 42(1):107-141.   
Hakim, S., & Neaime, S. (2001). Performance & credit risk in banking: A comparative study for Egypt and 
Lebanon. 
Hanweck, G. A., & Kilcollin, T. E. (1984). Bank profitability and interest rate risk. Journal of Economics and 
Business, 36(1), 77-84.  
Iacoviello M (2005): House Prices, Borrowing Constraints, and Monetary Policy in the Business Cycle. American 
Economic Review, 95(3):739-764. 
Rotemberg JJ (1982): Monopolistic Price Adjustment and Aggregate Output. Review of Economic Studies, 
49(4):517-531. 
Kaaya, I., & Pastory, D. (2013). Credit risk and commercial banks performance in Tanzania: A panel data analysis.  
Kalluci, I. (2011). Analysis of the Albanian banking system in a risk-performance framework. 
Kao, C. (1999). Spurious regression and residual-based tests for cointegration in panel data. Journal of 
Journal of Economics and Sustainable Development                                                                                                                        www.iiste.org 
ISSN 2222-1700 (Paper) ISSN 2222-2855 (Online)  
Vol.11, No.4, 2020 
 
38 
Econometrics, 90(1), 1-44.  
Makkar, A., & Singh, S. (2013). Analysis of the Financial Performance of India Commercial Banks: A 
Comparative Study. Indian Journal of Finance, 7(5), 41-49.  
Murerwa, C. B. (2015). Determinants of banks’ financial performance in developing economies: evidence from 
kenyan commercial banks. United States International University-Africa.    
Musyoki, D., & Kadubo, A. S. (2012). The impact of credit risk management on the financial performance of 
banks in Kenya for the period. International Journal of Business and Public Management, 2(2), 72-80.  
Naceur, S. B., & Goaied, M. (2001). The determinants of the Tunisian deposit banks' performance. Applied 
Financial Economics, 11(3), 317-319.  
Nawaz, M., Munir, S., Siddiqui, S. A., Tahseen-ul-Ahad, F., Asif, M., & Ateeq, M. (2012). Credit risk and the 
performance of Nigerian banks. Interdisciplinary Journal of contemporary research in Business, 4(7), 49-63.  
Ongore, V. O., & Kusa, G. B. (2013). Determinants of financial performance of commercial banks in Kenya. 
International journal of economics and financial issues, 3(1), 237-252.  
Pedroni, P. (1999). Critical values for cointegration tests in heterogeneous panels with multiple regressors. Oxford 
Bulletin of Economics and statistics, 61(S1), 653-670.  
Pedroni, P. (2004). Panel cointegration: asymptotic and finite sample properties of pooled time series tests with an 
application to the PPP hypothesis. Econometric theory, 20(3), 597-625.  
Pesaran, M. H. (2004). General diagnostic tests for cross section dependence in panels.  
Pesaran, M. H., & Yamagata, T. (2008). Testing slope homogeneity in large panels. Journal of econometrics, 
142(1), 50-93.  
Walker, D., Sussman, L. J., Mayr, M., Dean Jr, C. G., Seib, D., Musci, R., & Marino, G. (2000). System and 
method to performing on-line credit reviews and approvals: Google Patents. 
Westerlund, J. (2005). New simple tests for panel cointegration. Econometric Reviews, 24(3), 297-316.  
Westerlund, J., & Edgerton, D. L. (2007a). New improved tests for cointegration with structural breaks. Journal 
of time series Analysis, 28(2), 188-224.  
Westerlund, J., & Edgerton, D. L. (2007b). A panel bootstrap cointegration test. Economics letters, 97(3), 185-
190.  
 
APPENDIX 1  
Table 10 Results from PMG estimation for the sample of all banks in Ghana 
Dependent Variable Coeff. P-value 
Long-run Coef   
FP   
BC -0.177*** 0.006 
LR 0.205*** 0.000 
CR 0.241*** 0.000 
Short-run Coef   
ECT 1.116*** 0.000 
BC 0.148 0.262 
LR 0.141 0.032 
CR 0.117 0.000 
Hausman  5.83                                 
P-value 0.1203  
 
  
